Europe is rearming. Not out of a taste for military spending, but because it is afraid. And because it is discovering, rather abruptly, that it may not be able to rely on America forever to guarantee its security.
The war in Ukraine has shattered many certainties. Russia has shown that it is prepared to use force to alter borders, to brandish the nuclear threat, and to engage in a protracted confrontation with the West. Meanwhile, the Europeans are increasing their defense budgets, fortifying their eastern flank, and continuing to arm Kyiv. But the crucial question remains: if the current balance collapses, who will truly protect Europe tomorrow?
In this new landscape, France possesses what its neighbors lack. Since Brexit, it is the only nuclear power in the European Union. It has a deployable army, a comprehensive defense industry, a permanent seat on the Security Council, and a diplomacy that retains a degree of autonomy. Paris is not the natural leader of Europe. But conceiving of the continent's security without France is becoming increasingly difficult.
The return of nuclear power
For decades, French deterrence was primarily a national matter. Its raison d'être remains the same: to protect the country's vital interests and guarantee the president ultimate freedom of decision. The principle hasn't changed. The environment, however, has.
In Warsaw , Tallinn, Riga, and Bucharest, the war in Ukraine is not far off. It confirms a threat that these countries consider enduring: tanks, cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, military provocations, and political blackmail. Moscow's ideal scenario would be a Europe that is anxious, divided, and hesitant.
The American nuclear umbrella remains central. But political uncertainties in the United States have brought back to the table a question that many preferred to leave aside: what if, one day, Europeans had to take a much larger part in their own defense?
This is where France can make its mark. It's not about replacing the United States: its arsenal is neither the same size nor the same function. But French deterrence adds a factor to an adversary's calculations. In a nuclear crisis, this uncertainty matters.
Paris could therefore be led to open a debate long considered almost untouchable: to what extent can France's vital interests, tomorrow, be confused with the security of its European partners?
The question is unsettling. That doesn't make it any less difficult to avoid.
Kaliningrad, the time bomb
The Russian threat is obviously not limited to countries that share a border with Russia. Kaliningrad is the most obvious example. Wedged between Poland and Lithuania , the Russian enclave is one of the most sensitive military points in Europe. Moscow possesses resources there capable of directly impacting NATO's eastern flank.
For Warsaw or Vilnius , the danger is immediate. For Paris, it is more distant, but remains strategic. Kaliningrad serves as a stark reminder: in such a tense Europe, there are practically no truly "local" crises anymore. An incident in the Baltic can quickly become a matter for the entire Alliance.
France therefore cannot treat this issue as a peripheral problem.
Talking to Moscow is fine, but only from a position of strength.
Paris also has another lever at its disposal: a tradition of strategic dialogue with Moscow. France has long sought to maintain a voice distinct from that of Washington . This space has shrunk, but it hasn't disappeared entirely. It can once again become useful. On one condition that should be non-negotiable: never discuss the security of Europeans without consulting the Europeans concerned.
In the East, French initiatives aimed at Vladimir Putin have sometimes been very poorly received. The fear, particularly in Poland and the Baltic states, remains the same: that the major powers will seek a compromise for which they will later pay the price.
Paris therefore has a choice between two forms of leadership. The first is the most visible: speeches, concepts, and grand pronouncements on "European strategic autonomy." The second is less spectacular: listening to allies, strengthening the eastern flank, increasing European capabilities, and building a strategy acceptable to those living closest to the threat. It is this path that can give France real influence.
Take back the initiative
In the long term, Paris could put forward a fairly clear European agenda, based on three requirements: more defense, credible deterrence and a diplomacy capable, when the time comes, of preparing an exit from the crisis.
The issue of Russian nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad falls within this framework. No one imagines their removal simply at the request of the European Union. However, this topic could, in the future, become part of broader negotiations on armaments, military transparency, and reducing the risk of escalation.
Europe can no longer simply respond to Moscow's initiatives. It must decide what it wants. This is where France's opportunity lies. Paris has no interest in proclaiming itself the leader of Europe; it must become virtually impossible to bypass. A nuclear force. A credible army. An industry capable of keeping pace. A diplomacy that retains its independence. The tools exist. It remains to integrate them into a project accepted by other Europeans.
Because the future of European security will not be decided solely in Washington, Moscow, or Kyiv. Part of the answer could also be found in Paris.
