The Pentagon is spending a trillion dollars without modernizing its military capabilities

Despite a defense budget exceeding one trillion dollars, the United States is lagging alarmingly behind China in hypersonic weapons, drones, and autonomous systems. California Democratic Representative Ro Khanna is advocating for a sweeping reform of the military procurement process, driven by Congress.

The figure is staggering: the United States spends roughly three times more than China on its defense budget, yet it lags behind in several critical military domains. The Chinese navy is expected to field 435 ships by 2030, compared to 297 for the US Navy. Beijing plans to produce one million single-use attack drones this year; Washington hopes to manufacture around 300,000 over several years. This imbalance is not a matter of financial resources, but rather structural flaws in the way the Pentagon procures its equipment.

The root of the problem dates back to 1993. That year, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and his deputy, William Perry, convened the top executives of the arms industry for a dinner that became known as the "Last Supper." The message conveyed that evening was that the government would not oppose mergers in the sector. As a result, the number of major defense contractors plummeted from 51 to five in just four years, giving rise to the "Big Five": Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), Boeing, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman.

This concentration has produced a slower, less innovative industry, closed to new entrants. Every major acquisition program, from the F-35 fighter jet to the Ford-class aircraft carrier, is plagued by budget overruns or delivery delays. In 1989, virtually all defense contractors had significant commercial operations, enabling them to maintain a skilled workforce and incorporate civilian innovations. Today, companies without substantial commercial activity account for more than 60% of the value of major Pentagon programs. The defense-related workforce has fallen from three million in 1985 to 1,1 million in 2021.

The federal defense budget for fiscal year 2026 illustrates the contested priorities: $24,4 billion is allocated to the "Golden Dome" missile defense system, desired by Donald Trumpand $3,3 billion for the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program, two programs Khanna considers unsuitable for modern conventional conflicts. The Sentinel program, now estimated to cost at least $140,9 billion, represents an 81% increase over initial projections, and its initial operational capability will not be achieved until the early 2030s. To put this effort into perspective, Washington is spending more than twice the inflation-adjusted cost of the entire Manhattan Project each year on Sentinel and other components of its nuclear arsenal.

Congress bears direct constitutional responsibility in this situation: Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants it the authority to authorize and control the defense budget. Yet, it has often protected obsolete programs for reasons of local employment. The A-10 attack aircraft, designed in the 1970s, is the most frequently cited example: the Air Force acknowledged as early as 2014 that it could not survive in today's combat environment, but Congress blocked its retirement for more than a decade. Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), whose lifetime cost is estimated at $100 billion or more according to an analyst at the Government Accountability Office, have followed a similar trajectory.

However, avenues for reform do exist. The B-21 stealth bomber program offers an alternative model: starting in 2015, the Pentagon adopted an open architecture for its components, allowing numerous companies to supply parts without the prime contractor, Northrop Grumman, retaining permanent control of the technology. This choice accelerated development and reduced costs. Congress extended this approach to all major defense programs starting in 2019, and then to all acquisitions in 2021.

The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the Pentagon agency tasked with accelerating the adoption of new technologies, represents another partial success. Between 2016 and 2023, it awarded prototype development contracts to 450 different companies, 51% of which resulted in actual production. However, the military services often remain hesitant to deploy platforms developed outside traditional channels, preferring to continue funding existing systems.

Khanna advocates several legislative measures: multi-year supply contracts for autonomous aerial, surface and underwater vehicles, modeled on what was done for 17 types of munitions after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which doubled the production capacity of some missiles between 2023 and 2026; a law requiring the Pentagon to assess its own production capabilities to identify areas where the state should invest directly; and a ban on share buybacks coupled with a cap on executive compensation at underperforming contractors.

The Trump administration's Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) had also identified the Pentagon as a target for reforms, but only managed to reduce the department's overall budget by 0,59%, focusing its efforts on climate and diversity programs rather than on procurement dysfunctions.