In Kazakhstan, parliamentary elections were held without suspense or real opposition.

Kazakhstan is holding parliamentary elections this Sunday under a revised constitutional framework that concentrates more power in the hands of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Experts agree that the election leaves no room for political change.

Kazakhstan's parliament is changing: the former bicameral assembly is giving way to a unicameral chamber, the Kurultai, whose 145 members will be elected on Sunday based on party lists. Seven parties have been allowed to participate, including the ruling Adilet party, which means "Justice." But for the experts interviewed, the question of who will win is not even up for debate.

“The new parliament will do the same thing as the previous one, namely represent what the regime expects of it,” believes Luca Anceschi, professor of Eurasian studies at the University of Glasgow. Stefan Meister, director of the Centre for Order and Governance in Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), shares this assessment: the presidential party is expected to win the election, as recent polls confirm.

The two researchers see these elections as a tool to consolidate Tokayev's power, intended to further weaken the bloc loyal to Nursultan Nazarbayev, who led the country from 1991 to 2019. Constitutional amendments adopted earlier allow Tokayev to run for another seven-year presidential term in 2029.

The new electoral system has also eliminated the possibility for independent candidates to run. Zauresh Battalova, a former Kazakhstani senator who now heads an NGO specializing in parliamentarism, believes that what matters is not the number of chambers, but "the extent of parliament's powers, its autonomy, and its ability to hold the executive branch accountable." She summarizes the situation as follows: "The election will be based exclusively on party lists, in the absence of political opposition and with limited partisan competition. The scope for genuine political choice remains extremely narrow."

No reaction is expected from the European side. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the European Union has adopted a more pragmatic stance toward Central Asian states, focusing more on developing alternative trade routes to those passing through Russia and on access to the region's resources. "The days when the European Union and its member states were more critical of the rule of law in Central Asia are unfortunately over," says Anceschi. Meister believes that only civil society organizations, the European Parliament, or the Council of Europe might still react.

The economic context partly explains this restraint. In 2025, Kazakhstan became the second-largest exporter of crude oil to the EU, with a 12,8% share and 55,8 million tons, second only to the United States. "Wherever you buy your oil and gas, you'll never buy it from a democracy, unless it's Norway. In that sense, there isn't really a choice," observes Anceschi.

Geopolitically, Astana has so far managed to maintain a neutral stance between Moscow and Western capitals. Kazakhstan has neither officially condemned European sanctions against Russia nor decided to implement them. Anceschi describes this posture as a "geopolitical comfort zone," while emphasizing that it primarily serves to preserve the regime's internal stability.

Meister notes that Kazakhstan is seeking to diversify its partnerships well beyond the Russia-China-EU trio, extending them to Arab countries and East Asia. Astana “doesn’t want to be too dependent on Russia; it has seen what Russia is doing in Ukraine, and it also doesn’t want to be dependent on China.” Europe remains an option, both as an outlet for its resources and as a potential investor.