Signed in Mecca on Friday, the mutual defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey stipulates that any armed attack against one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all. Tehran is observing the situation with calculated reserve, caught between underlying concerns and a facade of rhetoric about Muslim brotherhood.
The pact was concluded more than five months after the start of the US-Israeli bombing campaign against Iran, a conflict that quickly spread to the Gulf and disrupted maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The three signatories were careful to specify that the agreement does not target any country in particular, and especially not Iran, and that it does not call into question their existing commitments with other partners.
In Tehran, the official reaction remained measured. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi posted a message on Friday calling on Muslims to "face every challenge from malevolent foreigners" and to "rely solely on themselves," without explicitly mentioning the agreement signed a few hours earlier. The Iranian Foreign Ministry issued no formal statement.
A senior official at the ministry, Hossein Noushabadi, director general of parliamentary and legal affairs, however, gave his interpretation of the text to the ISNA news agency on Saturday. He sees it as "the beginning of the collapse of American security hegemony in West Asia and the Persian Gulf," and predicts the emergence of a new regional order based on cooperation between states in the region.
Behind this rhetoric, more concrete concerns are emerging. Hamidreza Azizi, a researcher at the Clingendael Institute, points out that the timing is not insignificant: the pact comes after months of attacks by the Houthis, aligned with Tehran, against Saudi Arabia. Just this past Sunday, the Houthis claimed responsibility for a drone strike against the Saudi Aramco refinery in Jizan, while missiles and drones hit the port of al-Makhachka, killing at least seven and wounding fifteen, according to local officials. "Tehran's fear is not only that the pact will strengthen Saudi deterrence, but that it will ultimately facilitate coordinated pressure on Iran in Yemen, Iraq, and even economically via Turkey and Pakistan," he explains.
Several experts, however, believe that Iran does not feel immediately threatened. Vali Nasr, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, argues that the pact is more about building a post-American order in the Middle East than about directly confronting Tehran. He also sees it as a counterweight to the Abraham Accords, the regional normalization initiative with Israel that President Donald Trump recently linked to a civilian nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia.
Mehran Kamrava, a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar, shares this analysis: “This pact isn’t exactly new, and its substance remains largely symbolic for now. Neither Turkey nor Pakistan would be willing to get involved in the Saudi-led war in Yemen despite the recent Houthi attacks.” Iran also maintains cordial relations with Ankara and Islamabad, even during periods of tension.
Among Iranian hardliners, the tone is less conciliatory. Ebrahim Azizi, a member of the parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, warned against any "miscalculation," recalling that "Iran has proven that every mistake has a cost." His colleague Ebrahim Rezaei quipped that "a paper deal with Turkey and Pakistan" would bring Riyadh no more security than decades of unilateral dependence on Washington. Some parliamentarians also worry that the pact will ultimately target the "resistance front" of armed groups supported by Tehran and undermine Pakistan's role as a mediator between Iran and the United States.
In the longer term, the question of possible Iranian participation in the pact could arise, according to analysts, provided that a lasting agreement puts an end to the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and regional tensions. Egypt is already being discussed as a candidate for future accession, which would constitute a complex decision for Cairo. Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, summarizes the driving forces behind this rapprochement: “These three countries are being pushed to strengthen their diplomatic and defense cooperation in response to American unpredictability, Israeli revisionism, and Iranian retaliation.”

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