The 21st package of European sanctions targets the Garpiya drones and the Russian Rassvet satellite

On July 23, the European Union adopted its 21st package of sanctions against Russia, targeting more than 56 entities linked to the Russian military-industrial complex. Two priorities stand out: the Garpiya long-range drone production network and the Rassvet satellite system, presented as the Russian alternative to Starlink.

More than 30 designations at once: this is the approach taken by the EU to target the Garpiya drone industry. A senior European official explained that Brussels "mapped the entire manufacturing and supply network" for these devices before targeting it comprehensively. The 37 designations cover companies producing warheads, rocket boosters, catapults, and other components necessary for the deployment of these weapons.

The EU's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, justified the measures upon their adoption: "Russia will only agree to negotiate to end its illegal war and stop killing civilians if it is forced to do so. Sanctions contribute to this pressure." After the expiration of a three-day US-backed truce in May, Russia launched more than 200 long-range drones against Ukraine, striking energy infrastructure, residential buildings, and a kindergarten.

Researcher Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, of the Bruegel think tank, welcomes the military focus of the package while tempering expectations. "Russia has several types of long-range drones," he points out. Targeting a single model "will not, in itself, fundamentally change the strategic threat facing Ukraine." The effort remains relevant, he clarifies, but should not be misleading.

The second notable component of the package concerns the Rassvet low-Earth orbit satellite system, developed by the Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440. Sixteen satellites were launched in March 2026, with the objective of deploying 250 by 2027 and 900 by 2035. Russian media present this project as a national alternative to Starlink, intended to offer high-speed internet access.

For Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, blocking this program has direct strategic importance. When Russia lost access to Starlink in February 2026, it had "very significant consequences for its performance on the battlefield." Depriving Moscow of a domestic alternative would therefore weaken its military capabilities in Ukraine, but also its ability to threaten Europe in the longer term. "As Europe prepares to deter Russia on its own, it is very important to hinder its military capabilities in the next three, four, or ten years," he insists.

The package also targets suppliers of dual-use goods and technologies in third countries, particularly China and India, components that are regularly found in Russian missiles, drones, and tanks. Kirkegaard emphasizes, however, that what most tangibly strengthens Ukraine on the ground remains the direct financing of its long-range drones and missiles, an approach driven primarily by the Netherlands, Germany, and the Nordic countries.