After an initial contingent of 14,000 to 15,000 North Korean soldiers deployed at the end of 2024 in the Russian Kursk region, Ukrainian and Western intelligence services suspect Pyongyang is preparing to send an additional 30,000 to 50,000 troops. North Korean ballistic missiles are already being launched from Russian territory.
Military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang is expanding. At the end of 2024, North Korea dispatched a first contingent estimated at 14,000 or 15,000 soldiers to help Russia defend the Kursk region against Ukrainian incursions. Now, Ukrainian and international intelligence agencies suspect Pyongyang is planning to send an additional 30,000 to 50,000 troops.
According to Ukrainian military expert Oleksandr Kovalenko from the Ukrainian Center for Security Studies, these new forces would mainly be assigned to securing Russian border territories, notably in Kursk and the southwestern part of the Voronezh region. “These forces could free up Russian occupation troops,” he explained. “Russia would then be able to deploy about 15,000 additional soldiers on the front lines at Vovtchansk, Kharkiv, Sumy, or even Chernihiv.” He does not anticipate a North Korean presence on Ukrainian territory itself.
Russian military analyst Ruslan Leviev shares this view. Distinguishing the reconquest of Russian territory from participation in an internationally recognized aggression war on Ukrainian soil constitutes, in his opinion, a fundamental diplomatic difference. Leviev adds that he has not observed a significant and concrete North Korean presence in Russia, and that Moscow still has sufficient human resources. “If you look at the front line, you can see that Russian forces have been quite active since mid-July,” he says. “This is a sign they still have enough personnel.”
Economist Janis Kluge from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs confirms this analysis: despite signs of tension in the Russian recruitment campaign, regional budget data indicate that Russia is still recruiting about 1,000 contract soldiers per day.
On the missile front, the data are less speculative. Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) indicates that North Korea has delivered 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles since early 2025. In July, Volodymyr Zelensky reported that one of these projectiles struck a residence near Kryvyi Rih, killing two adults and three children. The HUR also reported that a North Korean missile unit is deploying in the Voronezh region, where it could be equipped with 120 ballistic missiles.
Military expert Yuri Fyodorov describes these weapons as “instruments of terror.” Comparable to Russian Iskander missiles but with a heavier payload, longer range, and less precision, the KN-23 and KN-24 can only be intercepted by American-made Patriot air defense systems, which Ukraine severely lacks. Kovalenko believes Moscow seeks to increase launches not due to a lack of reserves but to “spread terror further.”
Leviev notes that Russia launched far more ballistic missiles this summer than in previous years. If its stocks run out by winter, “there will always be North Korean reserves to ensure Ukraine cannot catch a break.”
None of the consulted experts believe North Korean involvement will be a decisive turning point in the conflict. Jenny Town from the American Foreign Policy Research Institute considers that the moment when this intervention could have significantly changed the situation has passed. She sees this rapprochement more as a mutually beneficial partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang, expected to strengthen as the war continues. Kovalenko, meanwhile, mainly fears the autumn: “October, November, and December could become very challenging for Ukraine,” he warns.
