French football thought it had weathered the worst with the Mediapro debacle, followed by the DAZN contract which fell far short of expectations. It is now discovering that the TV rights crisis is even worse than the worst predictions. According to The TeamFor the 2026-2027 season, the first projections sent to the clubs paint a worrying picture: Ligue 1 can no longer rely on its audiovisual revenues as a central pillar of its economic model.
The raw figure might still give the illusion of a certain volume: €412,2 million in audiovisual revenue is projected. But once expenses, the CVC share, Ligue 2 revenue, and aid to relegated clubs are deducted, the amount actually available for Ligue 1 falls to €184,1 million. This figure sums up the gravity of the situation. Behind the overall picture, the net sum to be distributed to the clubs of the French elite becomes extremely small by European football standards.
One champion worth €11,7 million, one last-place finisher worth €3,6 million
The projections are terrible. The French champion could receive around 11,7 million euros in domestic rights, while the bottom team in the league would have to settle for around 3,6 million euros. For comparison, the bottom team in the English league earns 125 million euros per year. At this level, TV rights become just one revenue stream among many, insufficient to cover a competitive wage bill, support an ambitious transfer window, or retain top players. For the most exposed clubs, this means an even greater dependence on player sales.
CVC, a support that has become a constraint
The agreement with CVC was intended to provide relief to French football after successive crises. It did indeed allow for a massive injection of money into the clubs and the league's commercial structure. But this agreement also comes at a cost. A portion of the revenue generated by the League now goes to the investment fund. In a context of growth, this drain could have been more easily absorbed. In a context of falling TV rights revenue, it becomes much more visible and much more painful. This is one of the paradoxes of the current situation: CVC's money served to stabilize French football in the short term, but it now reduces the room for maneuver in a period where every million counts.
Ligue 1+: the home channel's risky bet
The LFP is now relying on Ligue 1+, its own channel, to regain control of the league's broadcasting. The idea is simple: rather than depending entirely on an external broadcaster, the League is trying to sell its product directly to fans. On paper, this model could offer greater autonomy and a better relationship with subscribers. But it carries a risk: a significant number of subscriptions must be reached. The initial business plan was based on strong growth in the number of subscribers. However, current estimates remain below initial ambitions. Acquiring more matches could improve the situation, but not necessarily enough to close the gap. French football therefore finds itself in a delicate position: it must convince a large number of fans to pay for a product whose perceived value has been damaged by recent crises, changes in broadcasters, high prices, and piracy.
DAZN, the failure that accelerated everything
The current crisis is also a direct consequence of the previous cycle. The DAZN contract was supposed to offer a transitional solution after a difficult bidding process. It ultimately revealed the extent of the problem. The broadcaster failed to reach the expected subscription levels. The relationship with the LFP (French Professional Football League) became strained. The anticipated revenues did not materialize as planned. This latest failure forced the League to urgently revise its model. After Mediapro, then DAZN, Ligue 1 has lost some of its credibility with broadcasters. It can no longer simply promise a theoretical value for the championship. It must now prove that fans are willing to pay directly to watch the competition.
A redistribution that could widen the gaps
One of the most sensitive issues concerns the distribution of revenue among the clubs. A significant portion of the income, particularly international revenue, is tied to European performance and the UEFA coefficient. This system favors clubs already established at the top or those regularly qualifying for European competition. While this approach can be defended from a sporting perspective—European clubs contribute to the league's international image—it creates a problem of overall balance. If the mid-table and lower-table clubs become too impoverished, the overall quality of the league declines. Less competitiveness, fewer stars, less suspense, less appeal: it's a vicious cycle.
With such levels of redistribution, clubs will have to adapt their model. Budgets will need to be more cautious. Wage bills will be closely monitored. Player sales will become even more important. For many clubs, the strategy will be clear: develop, develop, sell. But this model has its limits. If everyone has to sell, French clubs risk finding themselves in a weak position in the market. Talented players will leave earlier, sometimes for less, and the league will lose even more of its sporting appeal. Clubs with a strong shareholder or alternative revenue streams will be better equipped. The others will have to tighten their belts. The DNCG (National Directorate of Management Control) is expected to play an even more central role in the coming months.
A crisis of income, but above all a crisis of business model
Ligue 1 is no longer a league driven by powerful domestic TV rights. It is becoming a league that must reinvent itself, rebuild its value, regain the trust of its fans, and find a balance between European ambition and the economic survival of its clubs. The most worrying aspect is not just that the champion can receive approximately €11,7 million in domestic rights. The most worrying aspect is that this figure now seems to reflect the true value the market places on the league.
The LFP can still pull off its gamble with Ligue 1+. It can stabilize the offering, simplify access to matches, adjust pricing, combat piracy, and rebuild a direct relationship with fans. But it can no longer afford any mistakes. The 2026-2027 season is therefore shaping up to be more pivotal than ever. Either Ligue 1+ succeeds in converting supporters into subscribers, or French football will have to accept austerity measures. And this time, there may no longer be a savior broadcaster, a billion-euro promise, or a rescue fund…
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