Since Peter Magyar came to power in May, Hungary has made a radical shift towards Moscow. The expulsion of ten Russian diplomats, accused of activities incompatible with the Vienna Convention, marks the clearest break with decades of complacency towards the Kremlin.
For years, no European Union member state maintained ties as close with Russia as Viktor Orban’s Hungary. The former prime minister, nicknamed « Putin’s poodle » or « Kremlin agent, » had made Budapest an almost friendly capital to Moscow, to the point that Russian intelligence services operated there largely without hindrance. Last February, it was even revealed that former Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto had passed confidential information from EU meetings to his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov.
All of this now belongs to the past. Since Peter Magyar took office in May, Hungary has officially designated Russia as a threat to its national security and has repeatedly criticized the war of aggression against Ukraine. This week, Budapest took a further step by expelling ten members of the Russian embassy staff for « unacceptable activities for diplomats under the Vienna Convention, » according to Foreign Minister Anita Orban, who is not related to the former prime minister.
The deliberately vague wording is generally understood as an implicit designation of intelligence agents. The minister specified that this decision « protects Hungary’s security and sovereignty » and that it « does not imply a break in diplomatic relations with Russia, » with Budapest intending to continue « the necessary dialogue based on mutual respect. »
For experts, the significance of the gesture goes far beyond ordinary diplomatic matters. Intelligence analyst Peter Tarjani described the decision as a « serious intelligence matter » rather than a simple diplomatic conflict, considering that Hungary thus joins « the mainstream security policy of its allies. » Political scientist Andras Racz, a Hungarian Russia specialist, recalled that Budapest was the only EU and NATO member not to have carried out such an expulsion in recent years, adding that this measure « really should have been taken four and a half years ago » and that « Hungary is now settling its old debt to its allies. »
Former deputy director of the Hungarian foreign intelligence service, Andras Telkes, highlighted in the newspaper Nepszava that the expulsion of ten people reveals a « very deep » Russian presence in the country. He welcomed the beneficial effect of this decision on the trust of NATO allied services towards Budapest, while measuring the gravity of the signal sent: « Expelling two or three people would have been a sign. Expelling ten is already war. »
Moscow’s reaction was swift. The spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry denounced a « Russophobic lobby in Budapest » and announced a « harsh and painful » response. Russian deputy Andrei Kolesnik, member of the Duma’s defense commission, mentioned the possibility of cutting gas supplies to Hungary.
This energy threat is not new. Under Orban, dependence on Russian gas long served as justification for Budapest’s pro-Kremlin policy, even though the argument of Russian gas competitiveness has since been disproved. The expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant with Russian support will also continue to weigh on Hungarian finances for decades.
Peter Magyar’s and his party Tisza’s electoral victory in the spring was built on a resolutely pro-European and pro-Western orientation. During campaign rallies, spontaneous cries of « Russians, go home » were heard from the crowds. Magyar and his close associates are convinced that Hungary’s place is only in Europe and that relations with Moscow must remain purely pragmatic and limited.
