Sochi, Qatar, Paris… victims of the “white elephant” syndrome?

Awarding a major sporting event compels host states to transform a surge in investment into a lasting legacy. While the specter of the "white elephant" looms over every edition, the solutions implemented in Sochi, Qatar, and Paris demonstrate that this colossal waste is not inevitable. From public project management to the involvement of industrial giants like the French companies Vinci and Compagnie des Alpes, urban pragmatism is increasingly taking precedence over the stadium spotlights in the post-competition period.

The organizers of the 2026 World Cup should expect to be asked this question. Quid Infrastructure and construction projects undertaken in connection with the organization of the event after the competition is over? A real can of worms faced by all host countries. Yet, the reality of the last decade qualifies the often-held notion of mere waste. Whether it's the creation from scratch of Sochi in 2014, the Qatari gigantism in 2022, or the restraint of Paris in 2024, these projects primarily act as catalysts for development. 

"The white elephant"

The organization of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi remains a prime example of the gigantism of a bygone era. For 37 billion euros, Russia established winter sports events in a Mediterranean seaside resort, drawing sharp environmental criticism and predictions of rapid abandonment. Éric Monnin, director of CÉROU, considers this model to be a prime example. impossible to reproduce Today, the trend in subsequent editions, such as Milan-Cortina 2026, leans towards simplicity. Yet, eight years after the races, the predicted collapse of mountain infrastructure had not materialized. A report from the newspaper The echoes This testified in the summer of 2022 to the vitality of the Rosa Khutor resort: designed with the French players Compagnie des Alpes and Poma, it was fully booked, driven by the shift in Russian tourist flows during the Covid-19 crisis.

Qatar, for its part, has developed a strategy where non-commercial use is fully anticipated for this Kingdom of 2.5 million inhabitants. The Emirate has invested $6,5 billion in eight stadiums with capacities ranging from 40,000 to 80,000 seats, without any objective of financial return. As geopolitician Raphaël Le Magoariec explains, Doha is using this infrastructure as a tool of influence against its Saudi rival, aiming to establish itself as a permanent hub for international sport. Indeed, the country has been securing a string of awards: the 2024 Asian Cup, the FIFA Arab Cup (2025, 2029, 2033), the 2027 FIBA ​​Basketball World Cup, and, with its sights set on the 2036 Olympics. 

The fact remains that the risk of a "white elephant" is on everyone's mind. The expression refers to a prestigious project that turns out to be more costly than beneficial, and whose operation or maintenance becomes a financial and environmental burden. Images of abandoned structuresExamples such as the Athens 2004 canoe-kayak stadium, the graffiti-covered Sarajevo 1984 bobsleigh track, or the ruined Beijing 2008 beach volleyball arena exemplify these failures. Organizers are clearly aware of these images and fear one day finding their infrastructure relegated to these ghostly "photo albums."  

The metro at Orly, the Lusail tramway by Vinci 

To mitigate this, Paris 2024 prioritized upgrading existing transport infrastructure rather than permanent construction, using the Olympic deadline as leverage to finalize long-awaited extensions. In June 2024, the extension of line 14 This project connected Orly Airport to Saint-Denis Pleyel in forty minutes, linking the Athletes' Village to the Aquatic Center while relieving pressure on the RER B and Line 13. The Île-de-France rail network was simultaneously enhanced by the arrival of the RER E in Nanterre, the extensions of lines 11 and 12 in Seine-Saint-Denis, and the connection of tram line T3b at Porte Maillot. However, this expansion revealed the limitations of the forced acceleration in light of the initial promises made in the 2016 bid. Almost the entire Grand Paris Express project missed its summer 2024 deadline due to technical delays and cost overruns. 

This compression of industrial time served as a pretext for a complete territorial overhaul in Sochi in 2014. Official data published in 2018 indicate that the region benefited from a road, rail, and energy modernization plan which would have required fifty-two years of construction under normal circumstancesThis major restructuring quadrupled the resort's accommodation capacity, with the hotel stock climbing to 80,000 beds. Economic indicators quickly validated this effort: by 2017, the area had recorded 6,3 million tourists with a hotel occupancy rate that stabilized at 78%, confirming the logistical viability of the Olympic legacy on the Russian domestic market.

In Qatar, the transformation was driven by the "Qatar National Vision 2030" plan, where the awarding of the 2022 World Cup merged the sporting calendar with the structural development of the Emirate. Of the $200 billion invested in creating highways, an airport, and the new city of Lusail, a major share was captured by large international contractors. The French group Vinci, through its subsidiary QDVC, was among them, building the Lusail tramway, the Doha Metro's Red Line, and the highway. New Orbital Highway 2On a social level, the organization of the tournament also accelerated an overhaul of local labor legislation. The implementation of standards on Vinci's construction sites, notably through workers' committees and superior management of accommodation, served as a field laboratory, used as a model by the Qatari authorities for legislating on the treatment of workers in the kingdom.